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A Candle of Darkness: Multiplied Deixis in Roberto Ciulli’s 
King Lear
Jerzy Limon
When in Act V, scene 2, of William Shakespeare’s King Lear, the Earl of 
Gloucester, blinded, resigned, and no longer desiring to ﬂee any further, declares, 
“No further, sir; a man may rot even here,” his son Edgar encourages him to save 
himself: 
What, in ill thoughts again? Men must endure
Their going hence even as their coming hither:
Ripeness is all. Come on.
Gloucester’s reaction to this is somewhat surprising, for he says (in the Folio 
version):
“And that’s true too.” 
As Bernard McElroy long ago observed,1 if he had said simply, “That’s true,” or 
“That’s not true,” there would be nothing unusual in this utterance; but he says 
“and that’s true too.” In other words, he equates two mutually exclusive options. 
It is impossible both to “rot even here,” and also, in the awareness that the time 
has not yet come, to face “the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune.” It is, I 
suppose, not without signiﬁcance that the words “and that’s true too” are the last 
that Gloucester utters in the play. (The Fool, in turn, will say, equally paradoxically, 
as he departs from the text, that he will “go to bed at noon.”)2 
In Roberto Ciulli’s recent production of King Lear (seen at the XI International 
Shakespeare Festival in Gdańsk, Teatr Wybrzeże, August 2007), the ambiguities 
of language are deepened by the fact that each of the actors performing on stage 
impersonates at least two distinct ﬁctional ﬁgures.3 One of these ﬁgures is not 
Shakespearean at all, and for that reason, and also because only Shakespeare’s 
text is used throughout, what is true for one of the ﬁgures in its speciﬁc context is 
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not necessarily true for the other. Moreover, whatever the situation might be, the 
relevance of Shakespeare’s language to one of the ﬁgures may always be related 
to the implied relevance of the same utterance to the other ﬁgure, by which the 
network of possible relationships is deepened and becomes multi-layered. This 
means that all the verbal utterances, constituting what I prefer to call stage speech 
rather than language, appear simultaneously in distinct contexts, by which they 
generate different meanings, depending on their relationship to one of the two 
ﬁctional speakers (played, as I said, by one actor) and their deictic axis.4 In theatre, 
meaning derives from the relationship of the denoted attributes5 of the ﬁctional 
realm to the material substance (and its modeling) of scenic signs. Since in this 
particular production we have two distinct layers of ﬁction (for the sake of clarity, 
I shall mark them simply 1 and 2), the relationship becomes more complex and 
depends also on the cognitive choices made by the spectator. Thus the meaning of 
stage speech may be drawn from the relationship of the referential world, as created 
verbally by live actors, to one or the other of the two ﬁctional ﬁgures to whom 
a given speech is attributed. The described situation, rather rare in theatre, relies 
on the actor’s ability to create more than one assumed deixis of ﬁctional ﬁgures.6 
Naturally, this needs further explanation.
In Ciulli’s King Lear all the actors are blind, from the very start of the 
performance. More precisely: through the acting technique adopted, they indicate 
that they cannot see (see ﬁg. 1). But they do this unobtrusively and very subtly, so 
subtly indeed as for it to pass unnoticed by many in the audience and even the critics. 
They move only reluctantly, and if at all, then only uncertainly. Their eyes are wide 
open and they try not to blink, by this means conveying the impression that their 
eyes are motionless and thus do not react to the external world. Additionally, the 
actor “playing” Gloucester hides his eyes behind extremely dark glasses. Naturally, 
since the ﬁgures in Shakespeare’s play are not blind, the spectator requires an 
explanation for their blindness in this production. In the beginning, however, only 
one thing is certain, namely, that the ﬁctional “actors” are blind, that they are cut 
off from the external space and the geometry of the world around them, which 
has a decisive impact not only on their behavior, but also on the proxemic (and 
metaphorical!) relationships between the denoted ﬁctional ﬁgures. Cut off from 
spatial relationships, external to the perceiving mind (as Kant and others have 
shown us), all they are left with is time, which is an internal quality of the mind. 
In this way, the production concentrates on temporal issues, which may be related 
both to epistemology, the cognition of reality by humans, and to rules that govern 
the theatre as art, of which those concerning the time structures involved are of 
uttermost importance.
All the actors taking part in the performance are on stage (which also means 
a stage in the ﬁctional realm) all the time; there are no entrances or exits. They 
stand still, waiting for their cues, and when they speak, they address the space, the 
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darkness, that surrounds them. Some take a few steps, feeling the furniture, the 
large, old-fashioned tape recorder that stands on the table in the center of the stage 
and plays an important role in the production, or the bodies of others, looking for 
support from them. Only Edgar (Steffen Reuber), half naked and ﬁlthy from the start 
of the performance, seems to act independently of the evolution of the “action”; he 
crawls over the ground, as if practicing animal movements long before the scene 
when, in the framework of the plot of Shakespeare’s Lear, he turns from a nobleman 
into mad “Tom of Bedlam.” In Ciulli’s King Lear he appears as an actor practicing 
the role of a naked beggar from the beginning. Sometimes the actors collide with a 
wall that is invisible to us and demarcates the scenic space, but this too is indicated 
very subtly, only as if it were signaling the rules of the theatre, which enable whole 
worlds to be created out of practically nothing in the material sense. Paradoxically, 
we, the spectators, see the actors bouncing off the wall that is invisible to both the 
ﬁctional ﬁgures and the audience. However, the fact that we do not see the wall 
does not mean it does not exist in the ﬁctional realm: what the ﬁgures sense with 
their touch (an act of ostention), we perceive through convention. We understand 
that the bouncing off signals an indexical relationship, based on spatial contiguity, 
between the ﬁctional ﬁgure and the wall. This means that the ﬁctional space is an 
enclosed one, similar in dimensions to the theatre stage, enclosed by solid walls; this 
also means that all the actors are set within that space (which of course contradicts 
the multitude of changing spaces employed by Shakespeare in his play). But this 
does not mean that they are on the stage of Teatr Wybrzeże, where there are no solid 
Fig. 1. General scene with “blind actors” rehearsing, King Lear (2007), dir. Roberto Ciulli  (photo: 
Wieslaw Czerniawski).
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walls enclosing the platform on all sides. In this way a ﬁctional space is denoted 
through the actors’ gestures and movements. 
At all events, we understand that the actors, playing blind actors, are creating a 
ﬁction. The space created is also a ﬁction, because the rehearsal is taking place not on 
the stage of Teatr Wybrzeże, but in some room, in some space built metonymically, 
and so conventionally, theatrically, without the participation of the audience (whose 
presence is not signaled by the actors). Thus its time, too, is different from that of the 
real performance. We are therefore dealing with a typically theatrical gap between 
the time and place of the audience and the time and place of the created world. But, 
as I have said, in the production under discussion there is a duplication of ﬁctional 
realities, which is achieved basically through the multiplication of deixis of denoted 
ﬁctional ﬁgures. At the same time we see that the departure from psychology does 
not involve a simultaneous erasing of the borders of theatre or an undermining of 
its rules. These are maintained throughout the whole duration of the performance, 
which is modeled in such a way that metatheatrical impulses take on signiﬁcance: 
the spectator is constantly reminded that what he or she is dealing with here is 
theatre, though not the kind of theatre that strives to create an illusion of anything. 
This theatre does not pretend, and the ﬁction that it creates is self-referential in a 
high degree. We watch a theatrical performance that is stylized as a rehearsal. But 
this is achieved by the use of every available theatrical resource. Puriﬁed of the 
illusion of the world outside the theatre, of the psychology of traditional productions 
of Shakespeare, it delves deeper in its aesthetics, revealing and explaining the rules 
that make it possible for the theatrical message to take shape in the form conferred 
on it. This creates a theatrical metaphor of human life and of the stage, of life and 
acting, playing roles. It is not a new metaphor—indeed it is perhaps one that is 
over-exploited today—but in theatre (as in all art) what counts is not only “what,” 
but above all “how.”
In spatial terms, the blind actors perform, as it were, each alone and for him/
herself. They utter their lines into space, which for them is a scalar, without direction 
or orientation of any kind. They also do not create by ostensive means the ﬁctional 
times and spaces that belong to the world of Lear; the latter is constructed verbally, 
with a marked distance between what is being said and the world in which the 
actors are set. They do not pretend that they are in pre-Christian Britain; they do not 
pretend to be Lear, Goneril, or the Fool. In this way a more complex relationship 
is established. For example, the actress (Simone Thoma) becomes related not only 
to Cordelia and the Fool she is playing (or rather, whose speeches she utters), but 
also to another ﬁctional ﬁgure who is not an inhabitant of the world created by 
Shakespeare and “lives” at a different time and in another space. Also, to make 
matters even more complicated, the three ﬁctional ﬁgures enter into all sorts of 
mutual relationships. This needs further explanation. 
The words uttered by the blind actor indicate that the denoted ﬁctional ﬁgures 
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in Lear are not blind. Consequently, their actions cannot be the same. You cannot 
blind a blind person, if we take Gloucester as an example; you cannot write and read 
letters. This creates a certain confusion in the spectators for it becomes noticeable 
that what we observe happening on the stage is not in the time and space indicated 
by Shakespeare’s text, and the actors on the stage do not fully comply with what 
traditionally has been labeled as Shakespearean. And yet the action still takes place 
in a ﬁctional space and a ﬁctional time, not in the here and now of the audience, 
even though the effect of the fourth wall is somewhat weakened by the fact that 
the actors do not have to pretend not to see the audience; since they are blind (or 
present themselves as such), they really cannot see the spectators. But, as I have 
indicated, they only pretend to be blind (and the last scene, discussed below, may 
stand as a proof); they seem to enact blind actors rather than the ﬁctional ﬁgures 
from Shakespeare’s Lear. This preserves the rudimentary level of ﬁctionality 
necessary for theatre to create meanings according to its speciﬁc rules. 
As is well-known, in theatre the basic rule that makes it possible and 
distinguishes it from non-theatre is the temporal hiatus between the created ﬁctional 
realm and the reality of the audience, and that is signaled predominantly by the 
actors who pretend, through verbal utterances and ostensive signals, not to notice 
the spectators’ presence. What follows is another phenomenon, typical for theatre, 
namely, the appearance of at least two time streams and, paradoxically, two present 
times, the ﬁctional one of the ﬁgures and the real one of the actors (and the audience). 
This, in turn, enables a historical past to be presented as an evolving present—a 
feature that distinguishes theatre from, say, ﬁlm or performance art.7
As a consequence of their loss in space, it is rare for the actors in Ciulli’s 
production to succeed in saying anything in “face to face” dialogue. They are cut 
off from the geometry of the world, which gives us orientation in space. Their words 
cut across the space in a variety of directions, often independent of the location of 
the interlocutor. This may of course be interpreted metaphorically as an attempt to 
emphasize their isolation, their imprisonment within themselves, lack of mutual 
understanding and inability to communicate with one another, a feature that may 
also be applied to Shakespeare’s ﬁgures (ﬁctional layer 1 enters into all sorts of 
relationships with layer 2).8 When they sit opposite one another at the table, they 
usually seem to conduct their dialogues not with another person in their shared 
present time, but with the voice rendered by the tape recorder: with past time. For 
the conversation with the recorded voice is a clash between two times and two 
ontologies. By this means, the past marks its permanent presence in the implied 
consciousness of the stage ﬁgures. They are not in a position to notice the material 
signs of the ﬂow of time: this seems to blur their perception of the present, and they 
all seem to be oriented towards past time. Moreover, from the point of view of a 
blind person who has lost a sense of space, the human voice is the only attribute of 
a human being (as in a radio play): it does not really matter whether it is “live” or 
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recorded. Thus playing the voice from the past brings it into the non-spatial present. 
This also invites further metaphorical interpretations, for the tape recorder may be 
seen as a metaphor for memory. A human mind incapable of perceiving objective 
space, cut off from the geometry of the world, relies on time only.
The proxemic relations, the blocking, and also the failure of eye-contact 
and of meeting in time contradict the principles of inter-personal communication 
as we experience them in daily life. Hence the distancing and far-reaching “de-
psychologization” of this production, which Hans-Thies Lehmann considers one 
of the features of the postdramatic theatre.9 Naturally, “de-psychologization” 
involves one of the ﬁctional layers created here through the relationship of the 
Shakespearean ﬁgures to the actors. The actors do not “represent” anyone apart 
from themselves: they do not play ﬁgures from Shakespeare’s drama, but ﬁgures 
from Ciulli’s production. Thus real actors impersonate ﬁctional actors. They only 
speak the Shakespearean text, while remaining themselves (I shall shortly explain 
this paradoxical-sounding situation). This is achieved through the lack of congruity 
between the verbal component and the acting. For instance, the voices of the actors 
are not modulated theatrically to “suit” the ﬁgure from Shakespeare’s play; their 
harshness sometimes grates on the ear (e.g., Cordelia). For a considerable part 
of the performance, Edgar emits only animal-like, unarticulated sounds, howls 
and mumbles; he is really mad, or—as we understand after his “transformation 
into a human being”—he does not believe that in his situation words or articulate 
language10 could change anything. He does not believe in the possibility of 
communication, in dialogue (but he too turns on a piece of text from the tape 
recorder: so he understands human speech, although he seems to be interested only 
in past time). However, even though the actors do not impersonate Shakespeare’s 
ﬁgures in any psychologically convincing way (to use a dated criterion), they do 
signal their attitude to Shakespeare’s text, even in those cases when it is based on 
indifference or total lack of congruity. But that is also meaningful.
All of this creates a dialogic situation between Shakespeare’s text and Ciulli’s 
production. The director not so much “interprets” the play, but inserts it into a 
production of his own creation, which in many ways is not predicted or implied by 
the play. At best, he translates the verbal into the visual, creating a transmutation 
rather than an adaptation.11 This creates yet another level of meaning: Ciulli 
consciously plays on the relationship between the ﬁctional world as indicated by 
Shakespeare’s text (along with its traditional readings) and the ﬁctional world 
created by what we see and hear on the stage. The former is basically verbal and 
supported by congruous acting, while the latter is non-verbal in the sense that, as I 
have indicated, the language uttered is not part of the world inhabited by the actors. 
It is external, if not alien. This creates a paradoxical situation, by which the realm 
denoted by language is not the world in which the actors pretend to live. And yet 
they signal to us that their world is not the reality of the spectators. The effect of 
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this situation is that we observe a split of deixis, or, rather, its multiplication. The 
“I” of the actor we see is not the “I” of the real person whose profession is acting 
and who appears on the cast  list; naturally, this would have been a normal theatrical 
situation if the actors had implied, through acting, that they had assumed another 
“I” to whom the verbal utterances “belong.” But they simply do not act in that 
way. We come to understand that the language “belongs” to someone else (a third 
“I” and deixis) who is predominantly implied by Shakespeare’s text, and not by 
the actor’s attempt to assume the role. This leads to the rise of two ﬁctional levels, 
which are in constant play in Ciulli’s production.
This brings us to the main topic, indicated by the title of this essay, i.e., the 
deixis. As noticed by others,12 the play and interchange of deixis is of particular 
importance in theatre. In the temporal sense, linguistic communication or events 
on the stage always acquire meanings of the historical reconstruction of utterances 
or events, which in some assumed reality beyond the stage were made or happened 
in a more or less deﬁned past. It could also be the future—then the dialogues and 
events are not an assumed reconstruction but a projection (in rhetorical terms, 
their proleptic function will be revealed). Accordingly, all linguistic utterances 
on the stage are characterized by an apparent internal contradiction: that which in 
a grammatical sense creates the impression of the present, the hic et nunc of the 
spectators, is in reality a re-creation of something which somewhere at some time 
has already happened or will happen. In this way, present time becomes a sign of 
past time, or perhaps the present tense of the verbal utterances is a sign of the past. 
However, in order to accept this, we have to agree to theatrical convention, which is 
a sort of agreement between the director and his audience. All of this is a “normal” 
theatrical situation, which may be explained by the temporal structures involved in 
the artistic act of communication we call theatre. But Ciulli’s production is more 
complicated than the “normal.”
Therefore, fully aware of the complexities involved, I propose a simple 
deﬁnition of theatre, which focuses on the temporal aspects of theatre as art.13 I 
have deﬁned theatre as a communicative situation, in which, by mutual agreement, 
someone (the “actor”) pretends before someone else (the “spectator”) that what in 
general terms belongs to the latter’s past time is taking place in the actor’s present 
time; in doing this, the actor assumes the role of someone else living at a different 
time in a different space. The key role is played here by the actor’s gaze (s/he ceases 
to notice the presence of the spectators and the space of the theatre) and the assumed 
deixis of the ﬁctional ﬁgure, signalled primarily through verbal utterances, but also 
by other attributes of acting. Of course, when an actor “abandons” or conceals his/
her individual deictic characteristics and adopts the one belonging to some other 
ﬁctional person, “living” at a different time, this is signalled on two levels: linguistic 
and physical, i.e., concerning the body. Usually, within the mimetic tradition, there 
is a conspicuous attempt to combine the two, the language and the body, as if the 
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adopted language used were the actor’s own, and his/her body were the body 
of someone else. This means that the assumed deixis, signalled predominantly 
by verbal utterances, ﬁnds full support in the modelling of the actor’s body, its 
movements, the actor’s gestures, gaze, his/her costume, makeup, and the like. The 
material substances constituting the vehicle of the sign of a ﬁctional ﬁgure on the 
stage are also engaged in building the assumed deixis. The greater the congruity 
of language and acting, the more conspicuous is the indexical function revealed 
by the actor in relation to the created ﬁctional realm. A further implication is that 
the language becomes an inseparable component of the material vehicle of the 
stage sign of a ﬁgure, thus becoming stage speech. All the words uttered enter into 
various relationships not only with other words (also those spoken by other actors), 
but with the material and non-material components of what is seen and heard on 
the stage. Through this network of relationships meaning is created and is unique 
for any given production. This demonstrates clearly the reasons why language on 
the stage becomes an iconic sign, why its functions (as listed by Roman Jakobson) 
change, and why stage speech is also a visual phenomenon. This is exactly what 
differentiates theatre as an art from, say, a rehearsal or play reading. On the stage, 
language becomes a component of stage speech, along with the actor’s face, body, 
wig, costume, makeup, and other elements of a given production, such as lights, 
noises off, the stage set, and so on. Thus, the language used in theatre loses some 
of its systemic features and becomes, basically, an inseparable component of an 
iconic sign.14 In other words, and paradoxically, stage speech is not only heard, 
but also seen: at least two senses are required for its proper perception. A simple 
experiment will prove my point: close your eyes during a theatre performce, listen 
to the ensuing dialogues, and the difference will become obvious. This explains 
why it is claimed, especially by theatre practitioners, that the actor speaks with 
his whole body. We may therefore venture the conclusion that acting in itself is 
stage speech.
In theatre, therefore, stage speech becomes a sign of the natural language used 
by ﬁctional ﬁgures. This explains why the “language” spoken by the actors is not 
the language spoken by the ﬁgures; it explains why, for instance, the actor speaks 
in verse (and, say, in English), whereas the ﬁgure speaks prose (and in Latin). The 
deictic “I” of the actor uses blank verse, and the deictic “I” of the ﬁgure does not. 
The former is a theatrical and iconic phenomenon (and an artistic one), whereas 
the latter is a linguistic and acoustic phenomenon (occurring in the realm of ﬁction 
where it is usually not artistic unless recognized as such by the ﬁctional ﬁgures). 
Moreover, in most circumstances, the aesthetic function appears in stage speech, 
and not in the denoted language that the ﬁgures use. Actually the aesthetics arise 
from the relationship between the two distinct phenomena under discussion here.
However, in spite of all the efforts and histrionic talents of the actors, a total 
coalescence of ﬁction and material reality is an impossibility, and they always retain 
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some of their individual physical qualities and characteristics, not to mention the 
fact that acting in itself is a peculiar form of behavior, often considered unnatural.15 
Generally speaking, we may observe that acting, like all other elements of theatrical 
production, is dual in its orientation: on the one hand, it aims at creating a ﬁctional 
ﬁgure; on the other, it points to the process of creation, i.e., towards itself. As is 
always the case, theatre signs are at least partly auto-referential, and they draw 
our attention to the material substance and its modelling of the sign’s vehicle. The 
actor, often known to us from other live performances, television, or ﬁlms, signals 
his/her own individual properties of voice, gestures, and movement, which s/he is 
usually not prepared to give up in favor of wholly new ones. Not to mention the 
obvious fact that some physical attributes of an individual actor cannot be concealed 
or replaced by others. 
We must also consider that usually, in theatre practice, it is the body (and some 
aspects of the actor’s voice, such as pitch, timbre, and the like) that reveals at least 
some remnants of the deictic function of the actor (the human being), whereas the 
language conspicuously signals the assumed deictic axis of the ﬁctional ﬁgure 
and in most cases cannot be assumed to belong to the actor. Owing to this factor, 
we do not lose the sense of the duality of acting, understood here as an ability to 
create a ﬁctional ﬁgure inhabiting a ﬁctional world,16 within a ﬁctional space and 
time. However, the meaning of acting is not only the creation of some ﬁctional 
beings, it is also the juxtaposition of ﬁctionality to the actor’s physical presence 
on the stage. Through this juxtaposition we are able to deﬁne the degree of the 
integration between what the actor says and what s/he does. A total merger of the 
two is rare and may be the result of a spectator’s illusion. (As indicated, in the 
production under discussion, the merger becomes impossible because, owing to 
the multiplication of deixes, we have more than one ﬁctional ﬁgure created by one 
actor (or, rather, by the director), which moreover, do not “live” at the same time 
and in the same space.) Also, the duality enables us to perceive the realities on both 
sides of what I call the ﬁfth wall,17 the actor at work and the ﬁctional ﬁgure which, 
being immaterial, comes “alive” only as a mental structure; this enables us also to 
evaluate the quality of the acting. Again, the aesthetic function of acting reveals 
itself on the phenomenal side of the ﬁfth wall, through the relationship between 
the denoted ﬁctional ﬁgure and the phenomenology of the actor, his/her utterances, 
gestures, mimicry, movements, and the like.
In mimetic theatre the relationship between the actor’s real deixis and the 
assumed one relies usually on their compatibility, if not on a total merger: one 
should not contradict the other to an extent beyond the spectators’ tolerance and the 
assumed criteria, which are, of course, culturally determined. Usually, the words 
uttered are not expected to appear in sharp contrast with the gestures, behavior 
and actions of the actors. They should be in line with the modality of the voice 
and mimicry. We may talk here of deictic congruity. As a result, the actor’s aim 
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is to signal that the language s/he uses belongs to the speaking body. However, in 
theatre that does not follow mimetic rules; the one does not have to be compatible 
with the other at all. It may be to a large degree conventional, accepted without 
any need for verisimilitude or psychological likeness or sameness. In these cases, 
instead of compatibility or deictic congruity, we have a separateness, which results 
in the sharp separation of the two realms, the phenomenological one on the stage, 
and the ﬁctional one denoted by the former. What follows is that, instead of some 
degree of likeness and merging, we witness two times ﬂowing in separate streams, 
two denoted spaces, and two sets of “humans beings” (real actors and ﬁctional 
ﬁgures denoted by the stage speech and separate deictic axis) entangled in conﬂicts 
in two distinct ﬁctional worlds. This is often a feature of amateur productions or, 
simply put, of bad acting and/or bad directorship (bad casting may have a similar 
effect). However, in the non-mimetic streams of theatre (Brechtian, postmodern, 
postdramatic and such like), the incongruity of deixis results in the “estrangement” 
effect, which in extreme cases breaks the intimate relationship between the actor 
and the enacted ﬁgure. This implies that the meaning is not generated through the 
typical theatrical mode, by which the features of the ﬁctional are related to the 
phenomenal. Instead, the actors appear as reciting a text that belongs to ﬁctional 
ﬁgures, without, however, impersonating the latter. The separation of the language 
from the body creates a vivid hiatus between the two deixes. In extreme cases, this 
could result in a situation in which the actors do not signal any assumed deixis of 
a ﬁctional ﬁgure. This could further imply, as is often the case in the postmodern 
theatre, that the actors are playing themselves in the here and now of the audience, 
a situation risky in itself for it may cross the boundaries of theatre as art. In this 
case the actors would have to signal that they notice the presence of the audience 
throughout their show. If they do not do that, it implies that a certain dose of 
ﬁctionality is preserved. That in fact is absolutely sufﬁcient to retain the basic 
features of theatre as art.
This is exactly what happens in Roberto Ciulli’s production. Although in his 
speeches the actor uses “I” to denote Lear, and “here” to denote the heath, we 
also notice that his body and voice retain a high degree of his “real” I, by which 
we know that it is the actor at work on the stage in the particular performance we 
are watching. Since s/he is not one of the ﬁgures in Shakespeare’s play, and yet 
through bodily movements and gestures signals his/her own “I” set in a ﬁctional 
time and space, the spectator is bafﬂed and seeks an explanation of this unusual 
situation. Consequently, the spectators—at least those who want to understand the 
rules of the selection and modelling of whatever is presented on the stage—reach 
the plausible conclusion that the actors are impersonating actors reading, reciting, 
or rehearsing a play. In this way, the verbal text ceases to be the actors’ assumed 
one, as, let me repeat, they do not seem to impersonate Lear, Edgar, or Goneril. 
They are themselves actors taking part in a rehearsal or reading of a play, living in 
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a world that is not pre-Christian Britain. However, as indicated, these are ﬁctional 
actors, set in an undeﬁned location at a time when tape recorders and refrigerators 
were already known. Thus, we are dealing here with three deixes, one belonging 
to the real actor, one to the ﬁctional one, and yet another to the ﬁgure from 
Shakespeare’s play.
Moreover, in Ciulli’s King Lear, the situation is even more complicated, 
because when actors impersonate actors at work throughout the play, it becomes 
difﬁcult, if not impossible, to distinguish the deixis of the real actor from that of 
his/her counterpart (acting has to be contrasted with non-acting: Ciulli provides that 
contrast towards the end of his production). Also, it must be noted that the separation 
of the language from the bodies of the actors, referred to above, is a valid statement 
only in relation to the ﬁctional actors. Their behavior signals the appearance of a 
conspicuous estrangement effect. In this sense, and from their perspective, what 
the ﬁctional actors produce verbally is not stage speech, but language isolated from 
its material scenic context. However, the separation of language and body occurs 
only in the relationship between Shakespeare’s text and the ﬁctional actors, whereas 
the congruity of language and body is fully preserved (hence artistic) in relation, 
complex as it appears, to the real actors who are totally engaged in what they are 
doing. This means that verbal utterances may be seen as both language and stage 
speech, depending on their ﬁctional levels.
As I have mentioned, fragments of the Shakespearean text are played from a 
large, old-fashioned, reel-to-reel tape recorder (see ﬁg. 2). Thus they are a recording 
Fig. 2. Lear (Volker Roos) listening to the tape recorder, King Lear (2007), dir. Roberto Ciulli (photo: 
Wieslaw Czerniawski).
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an evocation of a record of time past, which has been repeated no one knows how 
many times and is now played over again. In any case, at the end we see that Lear 
also as an actor has grown old and seems to have little time left to live. It is only for 
the time of the performance, the dialogue with the past, that he summons sufﬁcient 
strength to act. Could this be his last performance, his last listening to the tape (with 
a directorial bow to Samuel Beckett and Jan Kott)? The recorded voices from the 
past can be variously interpreted. Shakespeare, and after him Ciulli, inclines away 
from the unequivocal—they clearly prefer the sphere of connotation.18 The words 
once uttered are evoked in accusation or explanation, or as evidence as if in a court 
hearing (the ﬁrst to turn on the tape recorder is Regan, as if she wanted to clarify 
and explain her further actions); or perhaps there is another interpretation: they are a 
record of memory, reminding us that one cannot go outside the role one is ascribed 
in life however much one tries to do so. Here there can be no ending. Instead, time 
is circular: the curtain becomes a sign of yet another beginning. Towards the end of 
the play, Lear removes more reels of tape from the fridge; it too “prolongs time,” 
as if the reels were a fast-perishing product subject to decay, erasure, and hence 
oblivion. Champagne and oysters are also kept in the fridge, but here they are not 
so much a sign of upper-class luxury as of human eyes. 
There are numerous references and allusions to sight and blindness in 
Shakespeare’s play, but Gloucester is the only ﬁgure to lose his eyesight: in a scene 
of ferocious cruelty, his eyes are plucked out. This has been staged in a great variety 
of ways; but Ciulli’s direction of the scene is outstandingly original. Gloucester 
sits with his back to the audience, in front of the fridge. Regan opens the fridge 
and takes out the champagne and oysters. She spikes one of them on a fork and 
then swallows it, drinking the juice. One eye is gone. A gulp of champagne. The 
action is repeated, and the other eye is swallowed. Champagne. Shocking, but at 
the same time how theatrical! As I have indicated, meaning is generated through 
the relationship of the ﬁctional and the phenomenal. The stage power of this device 
should not pass us by: oysters, which we eat raw, become a sign of human eyes, and 
consuming them a sign of human cruelty and suffering. The champagne may be 
treated as a sign of the torturer’s insensitivity. But we should note that the oysters 
are a sign not of the eyes of the actor playing Gloucester in a ﬁctional rehearsal, 
but of the ﬁgure in the Shakespearean drama. The actor playing Gloucester (e.g., 
reciting his lines) does not even pretend that he has been blinded; he does not 
play the Shakespearean ﬁgure, but himself, the ﬁctional actor. Hence the scenic 
Gloucester—in any case blind already—does not react at all to the plucking out of 
his eyes. It does not concern him, because he represents no one apart from himself; 
he only mechanically repeats the role assigned to him. For this is a blind actor who 
is taking part in a rehearsal of a drama in which a person loses his sight. These two 
ﬁgures, the ﬁctional actor and the earl of Gloucester, inhabit different times and 
places. The ﬁrst does not want us to “read” him as a ﬁctional earl. Similarly, the 
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oyster is both a real stage property (as seen from our, spectator’s, point of view), 
eaten by an actress during a rehearsal break (for whom it is not a stage prop), and 
a sign of the eyes of the ﬁctional Gloucester. We can see how the multiplication of 
deixis in two ﬁctional planes changes the meaning of everything, depending on what 
is related to what: for us, the spectators, the oysters become a sign of Gloucester’s 
eyes. Also, the same oysters remain signs of oysters in relation to the rehearsing 
actor. However, the blinding does not concern the ﬁctional actors engaged in what 
seems to be a rehearsal (in both literal and metaphorical meanings of the word), 
and it is only we, the real spectators, who are invited to “read” the oysters as signs 
of Gloucester’s eyes.19 For the ﬁctional actors they are just a snack during their 
work. Of course, they utter the appropriate lines of Shakespeare’s text, but they 
are not emotionally engaged with it. In other words, from their perspective, they 
recite the lines (as language), which have not been absorbed into stage speech; 
from the point of view of the spectators, however, the acting and verbal utterances 
form stage speech, unusual if not unique in the tradition of “staging Shakespeare” 
and the scene involving “vile jelly.”
There are other symbolic and metaphorical scenes in Ciulli’s production (just 
as there are many in Shakespeare’s text),20 such as Lear’s conversation with one 
of his daughters, which takes place at the table on which the tape recorder stands. 
Lear embraces it as if he were embracing the past, before his daughter proved 
unnatural. At the performance’s end, the tape, taken out of its spool, winds round 
Lear, now overtaken by madness. Although he repeats his role many times, he 
has learned nothing: he has not changed and perhaps cannot change the course of 
events. He has grown old before he has grown wise, as the Fool says. He wraps his 
head in the recording tape, as if in the past; the tape is a sign of memory, of time 
that cannot be brought back and from which he cannot free himself. The Cordelia-
Fool ﬁgure even crowns him, placing a saucepan on his tape-bound head (see ﬁg. 
3). He, who thought he could be master of time and preserve memory with the 
help of a refrigerator, becomes a farce king. At some moment he places the tape 
to his ear. He listens attentively to something that neither we nor the other actor-
ﬁgures can hear. After all, he advised the now blind Gloucester to read with his 
ears. Ciulli takes advantage of this to create a stage image of a Lear who literally 
“reads with his ears.” Of course, one may also generalize that the past cannot 
be changed, and human beings cannot change fate or the course of events. This 
introduces determinism, which, we may suppose, neither Shakespeare nor Ciulli 
would entirely accept. Yet not a few references to blind and ﬁckle Fortune can be 
found in the former. In Lear it is said that to the gods we are “as ﬂies to wanton 
boys”: “they kill us for their sport.” We may say that Ciulli reads Shakespeare well, 
countering the dichotomy of human freedom and determinism once more with the 
assertion “and that’s true too.”
Owing to the fact that all the actors remain on stage all the time, while 
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ostensive signals do not create a different space than the real space of a group of 
blind people, we understand that the 
actors do not build ﬁctional spaces 
in relation to themselves, but remain 
in one time and one space. Hence 
changes of space and shifts of time 
in the ﬁctional world of King Lear, 
as implied by Shakespeare’s text, are 
not signaled scenically by parallel 
changes of time and place. So on the 
ﬁctional level (1), the actors are not 
playing at all. Generally speaking, 
the fictional time and space of 
Shakespeare’s Lear ﬁnd no reﬂection 
in either the actors’ playing, the stage 
movement or the blocking, or the 
conﬁgurations of persons. Obviously, 
there are some departures from this 
rule: in the scene played on a ladder, 
Edgar impersonates a nobleman 
hounded by pursuers. But on the 
whole the ﬁctional actors do not act 
out (again, from their point of view) 
the situations in which the ﬁgures 
created by them ﬁnd themselves; they do not act the lines uttered, just as they 
do not signal particular emotional engagement. Edmund reveals his arm in order 
to show Gloucester the wound he has inﬂicted on himself, of which he accuses 
Edgar. However, both Edmund and Gloucester—as  ﬁctional actors—are blind, 
so they cannot see the wound; we, on the other hand, can see that there is none 
(at the same time we see that they do not see). It is a ﬁction in which only a blind 
man can believe; but Gloucester cannot yet look with his ears. For the ﬁctional 
ﬁgures in Shakespeare’s text, the wound exists; thus, at least two different models 
of perceiving reality, the ﬁgures’ and the actors’. In this particular production there 
are three models, the ﬁctional ﬁgures’ from the ancient world of Shakespeare’s play, 
the ﬁctional actors’ from the world of rehearsing the past that Ciulli stages for us, 
and us, being the real spectators. They are all the consequence of the appearance 
of the multiple deixes that are in constant play here. What stands between us, the 
spectators, and the world of Shakespeare’s play, is yet another ﬁctional plane, 
which contributes to the “estrangement” effect. The juxtaposition between what 
the ﬁctional ﬁgures on the ﬁctional levels see and hear, and what we see and hear, 
generates highly original meanings, and, by drawing our attention to the rules that 
Fig. 3. Lear crowned with a saucepan, holding the 
recording tape, King Lear (2007), dir. Roberto Ciulli 
(photo: Ryszard Pajda).
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govern the created world, it becomes an important element generating the aesthetic 
function. These rudimentary rules of theatre Ciulli reveals to perfection. 
I have already mentioned the conspicuous distancing of the acting. The 
same applies to objects. There are very few displayed on the stage and almost no 
object changes its semantics in the ﬁctional world of the rehearsal, for it may only 
seldom be related to the realm denoted by the Shakespearean text. There are a few 
exceptions, like the ladder, a mundane object to be found in any theatre, which 
is used as a sign of a tree, in which Edgar hides from his persecutors. Again, the 
meaning of a given object depends upon its relation to one of the two ﬁctional 
levels. This implies that the meanings of everything are multiplied. In most cases, 
the meaning is metaphorical and inconclusive, as in the scene where the Fool lights 
a candle and puts it in front of Lear, but from his/her gestures we can see that s/he 
cannot see it either; the candle of course cannot reveal any truth about the world 
to the blind actors. The case is similar with the symbolism of the spinning top: 
its meanings remain undeﬁned. Perhaps it is a sign of the globe of the earth, or of 
time, running on as it revolves (like train wheels in old movies). It is usually the 
Fool who sets it in motion, but at the end Edgar and Edmund ﬁght for it: Ciulli 
stages this duel as a ﬁght over a toy between two small boys (see ﬁg. 4). It thus 
becomes a sign of something precious, something that one can sacriﬁce one’s life 
for—perhaps a sign of power or control over time, or the world itself.
In any case, since there is considerable distancing of the actors in rehearsal 
from the world denoted by Shakespeare’s text, the objects usually mean functional 
objects within the ﬁctional realm of rehearsal. Thus, the table remains a table, the 
Fig. 4. Edgar ﬁghting over the spinning top with Edmund (Fabio Menendez), King Lear (2007), dir. 
Roberto Ciulli (photo:Ryszard Pajda).
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chair a chair, and the fridge a fridge. As stage signs, they refer to the table or fridge 
in the created world, but this does not mean that we are dealing here with a form of 
theatre that undermines its own rules (as in the presently fashionable postdramatic 
theatre). Ciulli only plays with two ﬁctional worlds, two ﬁctional layers, two 
spaces, and two times: one is the world of the Shakespearean plot, the other, the 
world in which a “rehearsal of Shakespeare” is taking place. The duplication of the 
ﬁctional worlds is the cause of the distancing and de-psychologization mentioned 
earlier. Why? Perhaps because in theatre two ﬁctions cannot be played at the 
same time (the actor cannot play two roles simultaneously). They can, however, 
be represented alternately, or one can be made dominant and the other moved 
into the background. This is what happens here: the world of the blind actors, 
rehearsing the Shakespearean text, forms the dominant; while the other world is 
rather evoked than “played.” The major juxtaposition is between the real world of 
the audience and the world of the ﬁctional actors who are conducting a rehearsal 
(or something resembling a rehearsal), not the world of the Shakespearean ﬁgures. 
Thanks to this device, theatre remains theatre and constantly reminds us of this. 
It speaks of itself, even though it turns away from the tradition that sees it as an 
enactment of literature.
The fact that the actors are only playing the blind is conﬁrmed at the end of 
the play: the group of actors, having spoken their last lines, return to their “real” 
nature as human beings, healthy people who are only playing the part of the blind. 
Suddenly their proxemic relations change: they behave “normally,” they even hug 
one another, speak to one another, smile, each one seeing the others. Their behavior 
and utterances are conspicuously different from those that precede this scene; they 
are back to the space and geometry of the world, back to their present time (which 
now they perceive through the space). Thus, a contrast is provided of acting and 
non-acting, by which, retrospectively, we read the whole as a rehearsal. And at 
this moment the rehearsal ends, everything returns to “life” (though the rules of 
theatre are maintained: the actors still do not notice the audience, for they are set 
in another, ﬁctional, time and place). Only the actor playing Lear draws attention 
to his difference from the others. One may form the impression that, in contrast to 
them, he has remained blind: he still sits on the “throne,” he has grown weaker and 
is suddenly old and incapacitated (see ﬁg. 5). The actor playing Gloucester feeds 
him some kind of mush. He has trouble getting the spoon into “Lear’s” mouth; 
soon he looks like a infant with a dirty face. He really is a resident in a home for the 
blind or old (one of the elements of his costume is a red dressing gown). It seems 
that yet again the director has not deﬁned precisely the meaning of Lear, leaving 
it in the sphere of connotation. 
This also throws light on the function of Ciulli’s highly inventive staging 
device of presenting the actors as blind actors. It seems that we are dealing here 
not only with a metaphorical treatment of the ﬁgures of the drama. Of course, in 
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Shakespeare, eyesight, eyes, seeing, 
and blindness are structural motifs 
that appear throughout the text. A 
madman leading a blind man, seeing 
oneself and the truth about the world 
in a fit of madness, “seeing with 
the ears,” the blindness of naivety 
or cruelty, a blind man who sees 
more than he did when he had his 
eyes—these all appear, in a great 
variety of shapes, in Shakespeare’s 
text. Ciulli’s presentation of the 
ﬁctional actors as blind extends this 
metaphor of sight and blindness, 
to issues of time and memory, our 
cognition of the world, and our own 
identity as humans. But Ciulli goes 
beyond the Shakespearean text. By 
making use of the resources and rules 
of the theatre, he shows that it is not 
literature, but theatre that “speaks” 
from the stage. The director knows 
that among the audience there are those who read with their ears as well as those 
who read with their eyes. Still others can read with both ears and eyes, and yet others 
who cannot read at all and see nothing. The meanings derived from reading may 
and must be various, more or less in line with the director’s intentions. This is why 
Ciulli avoids the unequivocal. His emphasis is on the ways of making meanings 
in theatre; the meanings themselves he leaves to the sphere of connotation. He is 
the creator of a work of art, not of a moralizing treatise. 
It may hence be said that the theatrical rehearsal of blind actors, with a careful 
play of assumed deixes, expands into a metaphor of the impossibility of inter-
personal understanding: their utterances pass one another by, without reaching the 
other person, with perhaps only one or two important exceptions, such as the Fool’s 
dialogue with Lear, or Edgar’s with the blinded Gloucester. That’s true. In real life 
we cannot assume the deixis of another person to reach a better understanding. But, 
on the other hand, Ciulli wants to communicate some message about the world 
and humankind. So he believes in the possibility and need of communication. That 
creates another contradiction, but we now know that “that’s true too.” Dialectically 
both thesis and antithesis appear, but Ciulli leaves synthesis to the audience. This 
enables us to create all sorts of interpretations, even commonplace ones. For 
instance, experience, misfortune, and suffering bring people together, leading to 
Fig. 5. Earl of Gloucester (Klaus Herzog) feeding 
Lear, King Lear (2007), dir. Roberto Ciulli (photo: 
Ryszard Pajda).
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communication and understanding: despite their blindness, they begin to notice 
and speak to one another, instead of casting their words into empty space. The 
community of experience and suffering causes the scales to fall from their eyes. 
But in theatre (and art in general) what really counts is how meanings are created, 
and not necessarily what they communicate, even within the dramatic tradition. 
(Of course in notable productions a balance of the two is achieved.) In fact, theatre 
does not have to be semantic and referential; it may be oriented (as in music) almost 
totally towards itself, towards the rules that enable its appearance in the process of 
what Roman Jakobson called introversive semiosis.
At one point in the play, Lear, looking at the naked and shivering Edgar, asks, 
“Is man no more than this?” He ﬁnally knows that man is both only this and as much 
as this. Logically, both statements should exclude one another, but in Shakespeare 
and in Ciulli, they coexist. And in this sense the director is faithful to the playwright, 
much more so than are many psychologically oriented productions. Nevertheless, 
as an actor, Lear alone remains blind even after the “rehearsal” is over. The scales 
fall from his eyes only as a ﬁgure. Perhaps, on the principle of paradox, those who 
have eyes (the rest of the actors) remain blind, while the one who does not have them 
(the actor playing Lear) can see. It may be, however, that he has learned nothing, 
just as we, the audience, may not notice the candle that Roberto Ciulli lights for 
us. But he does this in order for us to perceive that “that’s true too.”
Notes
1.  In his Shakespeare’s Mature Tragedies (Princeton: Princeton U P, 1973) 8-9.
2.  I have drawn attention to this fragment in order to underline a characteristic of all Shakespeare’s 
mature tragedies, in which a frequently declared truth about the world or about human life proves to 
be not the only one: its logical contradiction also proves to be true. Hence there is not, and cannot 
be, any unambiguous interpretation here: even the most deeply considered ideas may meet with the 
counter-argument that “that’s true too, but …” This is why Hamlet both is and is not a coward, loves 
and does not love Ophelia, hesitates and does not hesitate in taking revenge. The dichotomies with 
which Shakespearean ﬁgures struggle are, to a large degree, resistant to the intellect; there is no way, 
by going beyond the paradox “and that’s true too,” of deﬁnitively resolving them.
3.  The initial distinction between an actor and a stage ﬁgure has to be made: the former is a 
human being for whom theatre is a profession or hobby, whereas the latter is a creation of the former. 
In other words, the actor is both the co-creator and the material substance of the sign of a ﬁgure which 
is immaterial and basically a mental construct.
4.  It may be said that language as used on the stage loses its intrinsic qualities, as deﬁned by 
grammar, and becomes inseparably linked to other material and non-material components of a given 
production. In point of fact, the verbal utterances of actors, which should be treated as elements of stage-
speech, may be treated as signs of the linguistic utterances of ﬁctional ﬁgures, which are not elements of 
stage-speech, and are governed by the rules of grammar of natural languages. Thus, the language used 
by the actors is something altogether different from the denoted language of the ﬁctional ﬁgures. 
5.  Of course, by deﬁnition the ﬁctional world does not exist in the material and spatial sense, which 
is why I talk of its “material attributes.” Fiction may appear only as a mental construct in the mind of 
the recipient. Let me add that creating ﬁctional realms is not the ultimate goal and meaning of theatre 
as art. This may be achieved in games that people play. What counts here is the relationship between the 
attributes of the ﬁctional realm, denoted by stage utterances, verbal and non-verbal, and the phenomenal 
world of the stage, as perceived by the senses and cognitive schemata of the audience. This is why, 
unlike literature, the substance of whatever is presented on the stage, along with its modelling, becomes 
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pivotal to our understanding of the stage communiqué and also plays a vital role in its aesthetics.
6.  We have to keep in mind, however, that the ﬁgure is much more than an actor is capable of 
creating on his / her own: the ﬁctional ﬁgure is a synthesis of the various relationships between ﬁctional 
and material and verbal substances of the performance, and it does not exist in the material sense, for 
it is created in the mind of the spectator. What this means is that the ﬁgure is constructed not only by 
what the particular actor who creates it does and says, but also by other factors, such as other ﬁgures’ 
utterances, behavior, costume, make-up, light, music, and the like. Not taking this factor into account 
makes any discussion of acting and theatre rather superﬁcial.
7.  The seeming physical and empirical impossibility of duality of the present time in theatre is 
in fact one of the basic conventions and rules of the art, and distinguishes theatre from other signifying 
systems. Thus, of the many systems and practices of human communication, theatre is unusual in its 
ability to create a ﬁctional (and usually past) reality as if occurring in the here and now of the performers 
and spectators. Without it, theatre ceases to be itself, and becomes another phenomenon, which may be 
artistic (such as happenings or performance art). 
8.  The motif of the difﬁculty and even impossibility of communication is not the invention of 
the director. It is a development of what he read in Shakespeare’s play. In King Lear the “positive” 
characters speak a highly individualized language, full of rhetorical ﬁgures, marked by poetic means 
of expression (with frequent apostrophes to the gods), while the opposite side speaks a language of 
the concrete (with frequent apostrophes to nature), like cliché examples of politicians in negotiations 
or business people.
9.  Cf. Hans-Thies Lehmann, Postdramatic Theatre, tr. Karen Jürs-Munby (London: Routledge, 
2006).
10.  I am somewhat hesitant to use the word “language” in connection with theatre. This is too 
complex a matter to be even touched upon in a brief article, but let me stress once again that I use the 
phrase “stage speech” rather than language. It seems to me that what constitutes stage speech is less 
dependent on grammar than its linguistic source, and on the stage becomes entangled in very complex 
relationships with all material substances used in a given production, whether material or non-material, 
whether live (like human bodies) or inanimate. It seems to me (and I am in a position to prove this) 
that in theatre one does not only listen to language as spoken by the actors, but, paradoxically, one 
also watches it. 
11.  I shall give just one example: as is well known, the verse meter in Elizabethan drama best 
adapted to scenic dialogue is unrhymed iambic pentameter (so called blank verse). In King Lear, 
however, we ﬁnd a departure from the norm: throughout the whole play, the Fool, played by the same 
actress who plays Cordelia, does not once use blank verse. This is by no means because he does not 
speak in verse: he sings rhyming songs, and yet he does not speak in blank verse, not even a single line. 
This may be interpreted in various ways, but this happens probably because the Fool speaks a language 
that does not invite dialogue: in his embittered wisdom, he has no desire to talk to anyone any more. 
The fact that he speaks results from his professional obligations, but also from deep disappointment 
with the world (and with his master), and not from his belief that his words can change anything, teach 
anyone, or convince anyone of anything. Ciulli translates this into scenic images: The Fool’s words 
fall into a vacuum, while the candle (a simple symbol of wisdom?) that he lights is not going to be 
seen by anyone (Lear does not notice it, despite his wide open eyes). Obviously, we may assume that 
Ciulli believes in the point of dialogue, the ability of people to understand one another, or at least to 
communicate. Otherwise he would not be a director of plays. For what would be the point? This is true, 
unless he does it for the same reason as the Fool. And that will be true too.
12.  See, for instance, Stanton B. Garner, Jr., Bodied Spaces: Phenomenology and Performance 
in Contemporary Drama (Ithaca: Cornell U P, 1994), Chapter 4: The Performing “I”: Language and 
the Histrionics of Place, 120-58.
13.  I have discussed these issues in greater detail in my theoretical works.
14.  See Eli Rozik, “Acting: The Quintessence of Theatricality,” SubStance, 31.2-3 (2002): 
110-24.
15.  Acting is an extremely complicated issue. For a theoretical scrutiny that does not concentrate 
on the actor’s psychology, or his/her work on preparing a role, see, for instance, articles by Jiři Veltruský, 
“Contribution to the Semiotics of Acting,” Sound, Sign and Meaning: Quinquagenary of the Prague 
Linguistic Circle, ed. Ladislav Matejka (Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1978) 553-606, “Acting and 
Behaviour: A Study in the Signans,” Semiotics of Drama and Theatre: New Perspectives in the Theory 
of Drama and Theatre, ed. Herta Schmid and Aloysius Van Kesteren (Amsterdam: J. Benjamins, 1984), 
393-441; see also Rozik, “Acting.”
16.  Of course, the actors do not have to impersonate ﬁctional human beings; they may enact 
objects, animals, or allegories. This is why it is safer to say that, simply put, acting is the art of creating 
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ﬁctional present time.
17.  I have discussed the concept of the ﬁfth wall in my book, published in Polish, Piaty wymiar 
teatru (Gdańsk: stowo obraz/teytoria, 2005). For the cognitive blending theory see Gilles Fauconnier and 
Mark Turner, “Blending as a Central Problem of Grammar” (1998), an article availale on the home page 
of the authors, and also their book The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind’s Hidden 
Complexities (New York: Basic Books, 2002).
18.  This invites yet another possible metaphor: it is predominantly memory that constitutes a 
conscious human being: we are because we remember, and this is why time and memory are vital to 
what constitutes our identity. Ciulli’s production may be seen as a variation on this theme.
19.  After his symbolic blinding, Gloucester tries to move away, but he falls to the ground and for 
a long moment executes useless movements on all fours, recalling Edgar’s animal-like way of moving. 
Through this similarity, a new equivalence is created between the father and the son; they are both 
thrown to the ground, literally and metaphorically. This becomes a sign that something has taken place 
that may draw them closer: the community of experience, of suffering. Gloucester removes his glasses, 
revealing huge, ghoul-like eyes that really remind us of oysters. Immediately afterwards, “the scales 
fall from his eyes,” while Edgar recovers human speech and faith in the value of dialogue. Perhaps for 
the ﬁrst time in their lives, the father and son talk like two human beings.
20.  It may be said that, thanks to his skillful translation of words into images, Ciulli’s production 
attains a high degree of metaphorical saturation. As a result, the performance plays “pure theatre,” and 
the effect is extraordinarily powerful. And this in spite of the break with psychology, the departure from 
acting as “pretending” or “experiencing.” The director reads Shakespeare theatrically and, through the 
introduction of additional deixes, creates yet another level of meaning, absent in Shakespeare’s text.
